Upon the occasion of the eightieth birthday of Queen Elizabeth II, it was to be expected that the “progressives” would start to talk about abolishing the monarchy. If I were feeling lazy, I should be satisfied with the rule of thumb that states: if such persons are against a thing, then it is probably worth fighting for, lest we end up in a bloody mess again. But, feeling in fine pip, I might as well take at least a glance at the arguments.
The arguments [against monarchy] are simple and compelling, starting with the very notion of heredity. Even the most strident monarchist will usually dodge that idea rather than attempt to defend it. They can say little to rebut Tony Benn’s well-worn line that we wouldn’t trust the airline captain who announced over the public address system, ‘I’m not, in fact, a trained pilot - but don’t worry, my dad was.’ [1]
Now, anyone who thinks Tony Benn’s analogy is valid is not in possession of his reason. At least a fairer analogy would see a pilot training his son from an early age, instilling in him not just the skills but the qualities required for the task, which son, when he was ready to become a pilot in his own right, would have at hand many advisors and co-pilots—or in other words, the analogy would run: “I’m a trained pilot, I was trained by my father who was a trained pilot, as was his father, etc, and I am in touch with many people who know a thing or two about piloting aeroplanes – so don’t worry”. It is an analogy that speaks in favour of heredity, not against it. Whilst we’re playing this sort of game, however, it is quite easy to draw another analogy, one that speaks against democracy: “I’m not, in fact, a trained pilot - but I have been voted into the cockpit by a gaggle of ill-informed passengers at the back of the plane, near the lavatories - but don’t worry, I shall not betray the trust they have placed in me”.
.....But, of course, the analogy is spurious in the first place: being the head of state is nothing like being a pilot.
.....Heredity is a neat solution to a problem: how should a governor become such – by desire or by accidence? In a non-hereditary republic or democracy, the governors must seek out power, and that for me is enough not to trust them an inch. In a hereditary monarchy, the ruler is invested with power which typically he did not seek. With the latter, there is always a fair chance of a good ruler; with the former, almost none at all.
.....It is often assumed that, since I am a monarchist, I must like the monarch—but this is a false assumption. It fails to distinguish between the body political of the monarch, and the body natural. The former is the principle of the institution of the undying Crown, the supposed guarantor of justice and upholder of the laws; the latter, of the Crown’s mortal embodiment in the monarch of the day. Now, of course, there is no guarantee that justice will obtain under any regime, contra utopian thinking. As such, to a monarchist such as I, whilst to oppose the Crown is treasonous, to oppose the current wearer of the Crown, if its incumbent be unjust and act outside the law, is not only permissible, but a duty. If a king becomes a tyrant, I am all for getting rid of him, and it is the relative ease, effectiveness and infrequent necessity of which that partly explains why I am a monarchist and not a democrat. Justem est necare reges impios – it is just to kill impious kings. Against the “people’s government”, however, little can be done; and moreover, the consequences of lese majesté against the monarch are benign compared to lese majesté against the people. As Kierkegaard pointed out:
If mankind had not embedded itself, with the momentum of centuries and the passion of habit, in the idée fixe that a tyrant is one man, they would easily understand that to be persecuted by the masses is the most grievous of all, because the masses are the sum of the individuals, so that each individual makes his little contribution, while he does not realise how great it becomes when all of them do it. [2]
One of the great questions of political philosophy is: How might men live freely together without strangling one another? It speaks not of some reckless ideal of freedom from the restraints and obligations of social life, which if attained would quickly find its discontents amongst its former proletysers, still less of who ought to rule on the basis of some hazy ideal of sovereignty, but rather of how the freedom of the individual person might best be attained within the confines of social life. In short, the answer ought to speak of a practical solution to the problem set, and anyone who is genuinely interested in finding the solution ought not to mind, all other things being equal, which form of government might best provide it, whether it be a democracy, an aristocracy, a republic, a monarchy, or a commune.
.....To those soi-disant rationalists, however, who irrationally believe a priori that the answer ought to be “rational government”, a belief held for no other reason except that it is in conformity with a mania for the pretence of being able to cite rational bases to all things, preference for tea-drinking doubtlessly included, I say that they have misunderstood the question yet again: it is not a question of which government might be most rational (to which “rational government” is the unsurprising answer), but of which might best secure the freedom of the individual within the confines of his obligations to other individuals. The rational response to the problem is to seek out that form of government that best secures its solution.
.....It tends to be assumed that we have found the answer to this question in the form of democracy. Under this form of government, however, a collectivist identification with the masses is politically useful, if not necessary, and thus it is most likely that it will be fostered, and thus that individuality will be stifled. As Nicholas Berdyaev observed:
Democracy is fanatical only at times of revolution. In its normal, peaceful state it is innocent of all excesses – but finds a thousand quiet ways of reducing human personalities to uniformity and stifling free-spiritedness. There was probably more real liberty of spirit in the days when the fires of the Spanish Inquisition were blazing than in the middle class of today. [3]
Political philosophy asks other questions, however. One such is: Under which form of government might equality be best achieved? It is worthy of note that it is not a question that concerns itself with freedom or the flourishing of culture, and history and experience teach us that it is indeed damaging thereto. It may well, however, be the question to which the best answer is “rational government”.
.....Questions about which form of government will best allow freedom and culture to flourish are rather futile, however, if the form of society and ultimately the character of the individuals that shape it are corrupt. Good government depends to a great extent on social virtues. I acknowledge the worth of republics such as the United States of America or the city-republic of Basel in the nineteenth century, before they slipped too far into democracy. Little can be made of a decadent, irresponsible, materialistic mass that has been shaped for the power-ambitions of a political elite – except great wealth and almost unbounded power. Culture will certainly not flourish – nor will freedom. The form of government, in its reciprocal relationship with society, can help or hinder the fostering of the individuality and the virtues necessary for freedom and culture. I am as impressed with the ability of monarchy and aristocracy in the fostering of these things as I am unimpressed with their crushing under democracy, socialism, communism, fascism, Nazism, and all other mass-movements.
.....Now, I am well aware that my views are hopelessly outdated and against the spirit of the times, and it is not only the “progressive” left that abhors such a “reactionary” stance. Most of the animosity that has been directed at the German monarchist group Tradition und Leben has come from the “progressive” far-right. [4] It seems that as long as monarchy—by its very nature of being a limited and private government—puts total power beyond the reach of those who desire it, it will receive from those quarters only scorn.
.....Oh, and by the way—and as it were—I wouldn’t trust Tony Benn with a go-cart, let alone an aeroplane.
[1] Jonathan Freedland, “Elizabeth the Last” The Guardian, 21st April 2006.
[1] Jonathan Freedland, “Elizabeth the Last” The Guardian, 21st April 2006.
[2] Søren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. A. Dru, (London: Fontana Books, 1958), p. 124.
[3] Nicholas Berdyaev, The End of Our Time, tr. D. Altwater (London: Sheed and Ward, 1932), p. 178, quoted by Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Liberty or Equality (London: Hollis and Carter, 1952), note 556, p. 323.
[4] To a “reactionary” such as I, the modern labels of “left” and “right” refer to the seating plan of the French National Constituent Assembly, and thus, as far as I am concerned these groups – fascists, neo-Nazis, as well as conventional socialists and communists, and democrats – are all strictly speaking on the left, the right being the designation for those who stand by the monarchical and aristocratic principles. (Call it an old-fangled foible, if you will.)
20 comments:
That'll be the Mr Benn who is the son of a prominent politician and the father of another, mm? Do you know, of all the many people whom I've heard bang on against the hereditary system, not one, on being asked, has agreed to give up his hereditary British citizenship which, by making him a member of the First World, is the explanation of much the greater part of his income and wealth.
Oops, I almost missed the opportunity. The wonders of government by the People's Party put Mr Benn in charge, some decades ago, not of go-carts but of British nuclear power stations. He thus became the fount and origin of the economic calamity that was the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor programme.
Interesting to read a defence of the monarchy that doesn't invoke 'tradition' as some infallible thing to be defended at all costs.
[‘Heredity is a neat solution to a problem: how should a governor become such – by desire or by accidence? In a non-hereditary republic or democracy, the governors must seek out power, and that for me is enough not to trust them an inch. In a hereditary monarchy, the ruler is invested with power which typically he did not seek. With the latter, there is always a fair chance of a good ruler; with the former, almost none at all’]
This is an old monarchist confusion: that A gains power by chance of heredity doesn't entail that A has no desire for power. It doesn't even tend to prove it.
Suppose the thought behind your premiss is this: if A doesn't desire power, A will be responsible in his use of power. Or at least, A will be more responsible than B who does desire power. But commonsense suggests otherwise: all other things being equal, the person who desires X is likelier to be responsible in its use than the person who is indifferent to X.
Incidentally, the right wing of the National Assembly included lots of theocrats and absolute monarchists; I’m assuming that you intend to defend some sort of limited monarchy.
"that A gains power by chance of heredity doesn't entail that A has no desire for power."
Indeed not. Nor does it entail that he does. That's the difference.
"Suppose the thought behind your premiss is this: if A doesn't desire power, A will be responsible in his use of power."
Not necessarily.
"all other things being equal, the person who desires X is likelier to be responsible in its use than the person who is indifferent to X."
Is he?
"I’m assuming that you intend to defend some sort of limited monarchy."
A minarcho-monarchy, one could call it.
'Cirdan', I suggest, is in error *if* my premise is correct that *most* people do not desire political power. Most people view politcs with feelings that range from utter boredom to complete detestation. Consequently, (if I am right) a bookmaker would tell us that the odds on a hereditary ruler actually wanting the job are fairly small.
And I must disagree with 'Cirdan's' argument from commonsense that "the person who desires X is *likelier* to be responsible in its use than the person who is indifferent to X." Surely the likelihood of X being responsible depends on his character, and a deep desire for political power is already an indication of a fault-line. (At this point I am desperate to use the phrase "ipso facto" but I am restrained by my total ignorance of Latin and thus my hazy knowedge of *exactly* what it means, but two days ago I managed to use the phrase "Follow that car" to a taxi-driver, and one must seize these rare opportunities in life, I think!)
Cirdan, by the way, the abruptness of my comments may appear rude. Sorry for that - I have a hangover!
Your comments are, of course, welcome.
Dearieme: "Do you know, of all the many people whom I've heard bang on against the hereditary system, not one, on being asked, has agreed to give up his hereditary British citizenship"
It is a good point.
Mr Duff: "Surely the likelihood of X being responsible depends on his character, and a deep desire for political power is already an indication of a fault-line."
I think so. (By the way, I wouldn't mind knowing what car you were following and why.)
Alas, only some friends in an overcrowded car on their way to the British Museum to see the Michelangelo exhibion, but still, I got to say it; just as I once stood up in a crowded cinema and demanded in a loud voice to know if there was a doctor in the house when I realised that my Father-in-law was not asleep but in a coma (he recovered!) But really, you can go a lifetime waiting for a chance to use these cliches.
Deogolwulf’s train of thought is this: Typically, in a monarchy, the person who gains power did not seek that power. In a non-monarchical republic or democracy, the ruler is usually someone who did. So, the hereditary monarchical method is likelier to produce a good ruler than the non-hereditary monarchical. What is common to those who seek power is a desire for power, whether as a means or as an end. So, the crucial premiss, which one rather has to winkle out, is something like this: All else being equal, a person who desires power is less likely to use it well (if he gets it) than one who doesn’t.
I maintain that the premiss is false as it stands, and that it is irrelevant to the argument for monarchy.
Some preliminaries: It isn’t true that heredity ensures that the monarch is someone who didn’t seek power. History abounds in examples of the hereditary principle abused and manipulated by those who most certainly desired power. Second, it isn’t true that only hereditary monarchies have rulers who did not seek office. Late 5th century Athenian democrats chose the members of their executive council (the boule) by lot; every man over 30 was eligible.
To show that Deogol’s premiss is false, I need to show that its negation is true. I’ve already given some argument for that, but suppose I try to show that David’s rebuttals don’t overturn my argument.
David first argues as follows: Most people do not desire political power; in fact, most people view politics with feelings that range from utter boredom to complete detestation. Therefore, the odds on a hereditary ruler actually wanting the job are fairly small.
Even if one grants the premiss, the conclusion doesn’t follow, because your argument is an instance of the division fallacy: from the fact that most members of a class share some property, it doesn’t quite follow that most members of a subclass of that class share that property. After all, most animals cannot speak, but it doesn’t follow that most humans cannot. From the fact (if it is a fact) that most people do not desire political power, it doesn’t follow that a hereditary ruler doesn’t desire political power. It would help if you pointed to some fact about people that accounted for their supposed indifference and aversion to power, and then showed that that fact was just as well-distributed in the class of hereditary monarchs.
Second, your argument, if true, proves too much. If one believes that most people do not desire political power, and that those who do not desire political power are likelier to exercise it responsibly than those who do; then isn’t the most reasonable course of action to randomly choose one’s ruler from the class of most people? But that isn’t really compatible with hereditary monarchy.
David’s second argument: The likelihood of A being responsible in the use of power depends on his character, a deep desire for political power is already an indication of a character fault, so it’s not the case that the person who desires power is likelier to be responsible in its use than the person who is indifferent to power.
First, I’ll deny the second premiss. That A desires political power is insufficient to establish that A’s character is flawed. Commonsense suggests that one judges someone else’s desire for power only after one has inquired into the motives for that desire.
Second, I was careful to include a ceteris paribus clause in my argument from commonsense. That argument proceeds thus: take two people, A with a desire for X, and B who is indifferent to X. Assume that all else is equal between them. Commonsense suggests that A is likeliest to be responsible in the use of X if his desire is satisfied. This is only to be expected, since what one desires is valuable to one, and one is likely to be responsible in the use of what one considers valuable. My argument isn’t refuted by the suggestion that a desire for political power is in itself a character flaw. For that is false. Even if it were true that a desire for political power is a character flaw, the ceteris paribus clause absorbs its force: A and B are now equally flawed in character, but it’s still true that the one who desires X is likelier to use X responsibly when his desire for X is satisfied.
Let me now try to show why Deogol’s premiss is irrelevant to the argument.
Suppose it is true that those who do not desire power are likeliest to be responsible in its use. So we need a method of choosing a ruler which maximises the chance of the ruler being indifferent to power. The most reasonable way of doing so is to choose a ruler at random from the class of all adult members of the population, à la the ancient Athenians. No hereditary monarchist ever accepts this consequence of his position. Indeed, the hereditary monarchist confines the class of eligibles to that of (usually male) people related to some arbitrarily chosen person. All of which suggests that the power-indifference premiss isn’t what is doing the real work in the monarchist argument, hence its irrelevance.
Cirdan: "Deogolwulf’s train of thought is this: Typically, in a monarchy, the person who gains power did not seek that power. In a non-monarchical republic or democracy, the ruler is usually someone who did. So, the hereditary monarchical method is likelier to produce a good ruler than the non-hereditary monarchical."
First off, I said I do not trust those who seek out power:
"In a non-hereditary republic or democracy, the governors must seek out power, and that for me is enough not to trust them an inch. In a hereditary monarchy, the ruler is invested with power which typically he did not seek. With the latter, there is always a fair chance of a good ruler; with the former, almost none at all."
With a non-random non-hereditary governor, that power must be sought out. With an hereditary, that is not necessarily so. The implicit premise is as you state: "All else being equal, a person who desires power is less likely to use it well (if he gets it) than one who doesn’t".), which we will come to in a moment.
Cirdan: "It isn’t true that heredity ensures that the monarch is someone who didn’t seek power."
Indeed not, which is why I said "typically". But whereas those who seek power seek power, those born to it do not necessarily seek it.
In support of your belief that my aforementioned premise is false, you state:
"[T]ake two people, A with a desire for X, and B who is indifferent to X. Assume that all else is equal between them. Commonsense suggests that A is likeliest to be responsible in the use of X if his desire is satisfied."
Let X be alcohol . . . Ah, alcholism. It is interesting to be informed that when the alcoholic is drunk - when his desire is satisfied - that he can be said to be - and have been - more responsible in its use than the teetotaler. I would have thought power was a more compelling example than alcohol, but then you appear not to think so. You have an interesting take on history (and commonsense), to say the least. I suspect, moreover, that those who seek out power, those who have had to fight and claw their way to it, are rarely satisfied, just as the self-made billionaire still desires more wealth. Perhaps it is like a drug.
"Suppose it is true that those who do not desire power are likeliest to be responsible in its use. So we need a method of choosing a ruler which maximises the chance of the ruler being indifferent to power. The most reasonable way of doing so is to choose a ruler at random from the class of all adult members of the population"
All things being equal, indeed so. But there are other matters that weigh in favour of monarchy, not least the distinct possiblity that the monarch has been trained from an early age in the responsible use of it.
It is unlikely that the (alcoholic, teetotaller, alcohol) relation and the (desirer of power, indifferent to power, power) relation are identical, for the teetotaller is averse to alcohol where we want someone who is indifferent to power. Besides, the object of the alcoholic’s desire is not obvious. It seems reasonable to ask whether the alcoholic desires alcohol in any serious way at all, or whether he desires the state of mind that comes from drinking alcohol, or even the state of mind that comes from drinking too much alcohol, or something else altogether. But let that pass.
I think that the counterexample you present is compelling only if one holds that the alcoholic acts as he does because he desires alcohol inordinately. If he acts as he does for some non-desire reason, then my premiss is unharmed. So the model of addiction (or weakness of will – call it akrasia hereafter) you’re working with is this: an addict (or akratic) is one whose will is defeated by the strength of his desire.
I’ll argue that that is an implausible understanding of addiction: the pathology is located elsewhere, so your analogy fails, and with it, your argument. Actually, I think it’s likelier that the alcoholic is not an alcoholic because of an excessive desire for alcohol, but because of a deficiency or pathology of the will – addiction is rather a defect of the will, than of the appetite. Maybe this is why addict and weak-willed are so close in meaning.
The obvious way to distinguish the desires associated with addiction from those that aren’t is by their strength. But that simply won’t work. We have many very strong desires which are non-addictive (any normal person will have strong and persistent desires for food etc.), and weak desires that are addictive. (An alcoholic might very strongly desire to give up alcohol and only very weakly desire to continue drinking, yet continue to be an alcoholic). Indeed, one can become addicted to the object of almost any desire.
Again, suppose that addiction is the defeat of one’s will by some desire D due to the strength of D. If that were true, then one would expect other desires of the same strength as D to defeat the will equally regularly. But, typically, the addict is addicted to some things but not to others, even when his desire for them is just as strong as D.
But if there’s no reliable way to sort out desires associated with addiction from desires not associated with addiction, then it’s unlikely that addiction can be explained in terms of desire. If so, then the analogy you want won’t run, because the problem (I suggest) shifts to the will. For your criticism to stick, you need a pathology of desire to be the cause of addiction or akrasia. But there are reasons to deny that, and so to deny your argument.
Now to your other point:
I wrote ["Suppose it is true that those who do not desire power are likeliest to be responsible in its use. So we need a method of choosing a ruler which maximises the chance of the ruler being indifferent to power. The most reasonable way of doing so is to choose a ruler at random from the class of all adult members of the population"]
You replied All things being equal, indeed so. But there are other matters that weigh in favour of monarchy, not least the distinct possibility that the monarch has been trained from an early age in the responsible use of it.
As we saw earlier, you need some additional premiss to justify confining the eligibility class to those descended from some arbitrarily chosen person. That the monarch needs training from an early age is insufficient to justify that move, even if one thought it was true. Couldn’t one be trained just as well in the use of power by wise non-relatives?
Most of my reply to Cirdan's comments is contained in the post "A Little Spat over Monarchy". On Cirdan's last comment, his idea is that one could have some kind of lottery so that one end's up with a non-hereditary monarch who did not seek power, but who attained it through accident. I did intimate in my original post that this is not the neat solution as supplied by heredity. Can you imagine - a government-run lottery for the head of state? Doesn't bear thinking about!
"...a non-hereditary monarch who did not seek power, but who attained it through accident."
"...training from an early age"
"Couldn’t one be trained just as well in the use of power by wise non-relatives?"
"Can you imagine - a government-run lottery for the head of state? Doesn't bear thinking about."
Why not consider following the Tibetan example and select our very own Dalai Lama, only without the reincarnation?
You could randomly select a three year old as the future political head of state and have them brought up by 'wise non-relatives' with a sound education in the responsible use of power and the effective use of will (among other things). This system might satisfy not only those against hereditary power, but those who are for a monarch.
The Political head of state would have attained power through no will of their own whilst being given the skills to use it responsibly and respectfully from an early age.
Of course this system requires that those educating the youngster are capable of doing so without prejudice and have no political ambitions of their own and society is simply not able to satisfy this demand.
It is also unlikely that any argument, however strong, will defeat democratic greed.
If we all tried to put the needs of others (including the environment) before the needs of the self we would not have this problem of a rotten democracy centered around satisfying the selfish desires of a nation of individuals only concerned with their own gain at any expense to others.
Whatever political system is in place, each individual must take responsibility for the society and world around them. What good is a democracy of selfless saints or a selfless monarch if the society they govern is out for the self?
Despite my charitable activities, and my home recycling policies, would I give up the possibility of one day living a comfortable life creaming money from those lower down the wealth ladder in some sort of capitalist venture? Well of course I would, so I guess what we really need is a benevolent dictator to take away our rights as the individual in favour of a socialist utopia - oh wait, don't we already know that doesn't work...
Perhaps chaos has the answers. Paper, scissors, stone anyone?
Whoops... I meant to say 'Well of couse I wouldn't' - i'm no Ghandi.
"Why not consider following the Tibetan example and select our very own Dalai Lama, only without the reincarnation?"
It is certainly worthy of consideration, and I have no great objection to it. But I don't think it provides the "neat solution" of heredity. Nor am I especially for the imposition of any ideas upon society; rather I am more in favour of spontaneous order; for I suspect the constitution of a society to be too delicate a thing not to be upset by the forced introduction of a new and "better" diet.
A nation settles within a certain tradition - an equilibrium, if you will - from which it may well be undesirable to move it, on account of the upheaval that this would involve, and it may be undesirable even for the sake of the imposition of a "better" idea; for even though another idea might be better in the light of abstract argument -- on paper, as it were --it is unlikely that it encapsulates sufficiently the vast complexity of society, especially the "irrationalities", habits and unfathomables of human behaviour. There is a tendancy for proponents of such ideas to jetison tradition as worse than useless. But they fail to consider the function of tradition in helping to keep some "constitutional balance", as it were, without which society would be sick. I think tradition is all-important as a check on the hubris of fine ideas.
Still, I try not to be dogmatic about such things, but rather take things as they come.
What tosh!
Your alternative analogy of the aeroplane pilot scenario is fatally flawed. I would like to assume that when I get in a plane the pilot has been chosen by the airline company by a fair interview process, whereby the best person (i.e. most qualified or otherwise suitable) gets to fly the plane. I don't want to risk my safety by being flown by somebody who "won" the job in a genetic lottery.
So if this mythical pilot, who has been "trained" from an early age is the best person for the job, why isn't he/she prepared to go to a bloody interview to get the job???! The lazy beggar. If they are the best person for the job, they will surely get it, so what are they worried about?
And if the chosen pilot turns out to be rubbish, they can be sacked by the airline because there is a sensible process in place for that. In your scenario the pilot "trained" by their father would presumably get the job for life (until 100+?) because there is no recourse - the job is their "right" and nobody can take it away from them.
And presumably in your scenario, when a complete dud is born into the family with no aptitude or will for flying a plane - perhaps even blind or crazy - they should be the pilot anyway "because that's just how it works".
Finally, a pilot doesn't represent me as my head of state, the monarch does. As a human being who believes we should be born free and with equality of opportunity, all I want is a say in who this person is at the top of the country's power tree.
Please have a bit more faith in the British people to be able to choose their own head of state and not be told who they have to have. I hope it doesn't take a blind, crazy man in charge to make us realise there is a better way.
I said: "the analogy is spurious in the first place: being the head of state is nothing like being a pilot."
Did you miss that bit?
You said: "I don't want to risk my safety by being flown by somebody who "won" the job in a genetic lottery."
I think you have allowed the spurious analogy to get hold of you; and so I should like to remind you that pilots are not chosen that way.
You say: "If they are the best person for the job, they will surely get it"
I'm not quite sure why you think an affirmation of faith at this point will persuade me.
You say: "Finally, a pilot doesn't represent me as my head of state, the monarch does".
Phew! I thought we'd lost you for a moment there.
"all I want is a say in who this person is at the top of the country's power tree"
Well good for you -- and for the millions of others, by which your say becomes rather insignificant. Still, if you wish to remain with the self-important delusion that your particular say matters, then please do so.
"Please have a bit more faith in the British people"
Why? Since I am something of a sceptic in matters political and otherwise, you might appreciate that exhorting me to join the ranks of the faithful is rather a dud strategem. Perhaps if I close my eyes and try hard . . . no, it's no use: faith still eludes me.
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