tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post5741824956537853286..comments2023-11-02T11:32:38.324+00:00Comments on The Joy of Curmudgeonry: The Hard Problem of Feeling; or, What is it Like to Be a Batty Philosopher?Deogolwulfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02197539477668018797noreply@blogger.comBlogger22125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-48679318700436210692008-09-06T11:28:00.000+01:002008-09-06T11:28:00.000+01:00Intervening was probably the wrong word for the la...Intervening was probably the wrong word for the last comment was a month ago:-)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-74216738002937673692008-09-06T11:23:00.000+01:002008-09-06T11:23:00.000+01:00Hi,I apologize for intervening in the discussion, ...Hi,<BR/>I apologize for intervening in the discussion, but I could need some help with philosophy.<BR/><BR/>Why exactly does it need to be like something to see red?<BR/>What answer is expected to the question, what is it like to ...?<BR/><BR/>It's possible to describe it in quite some detail: it's a color, it has a certain wavelength, there are some processes in the eye and the brain, why is that not enough?<BR/>If you would want to know to the last detail how it feels to be me, you would need to be me. That might be mysterious, but not more mysterious than the fact that it is not possible for a stone to be at the place where there is another stone already.<BR/><BR/>David<BR/><BR/>PS: Does anybody know whether the observer effect in quantum physics also works with a chimpanzee as an observer? with a fly? with a camera?<BR/><BR/>PPS: I don't think Dennett means to say that you have no feelings, but that there is disagreement in the definition of feeling.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-31762682531638926972008-08-12T11:56:00.000+01:002008-08-12T11:56:00.000+01:00Deogolwulf (to Mr Weinberg): "... As Galen Strawso...<B>Deogolwulf (to Mr Weinberg):</B> "<I>... As Galen Strawson puts it, Dennett “looking-glasses” the word “consciousness” to mean something that involves no consciousness. Why? Because consciousness is a damned difficult thing to fit into standard physicalism. (See also Harnad, footnote 22, and the links to his papers.) Dennett does not say that qualia (or “feelings”, as I prefer) come about as a result of dispositions and blah-di-blah; he denies that they come about at all. He does not say that any intelligent being would experience qualia; on the contrary, he says that no being experiences qualia, that qualia are nothing but blah-di-blah. If Dennett’s ideas about “consciousness” are close to correct, as you put it, then not only could such an intelligent but feelingless being exist, but, according to him, you are one.</I>"<BR/><BR/>Exactly.<BR/><BR/>If "physicalism" or "naturalism" or "materialism" (or as I generally prefer, "atheism") were indeed the truth about the nature of reality, than beings such as ourselves, as we experience and understand ourselves to be, logically cannot exist.<BR/><BR/>And yet we do exist. And we do experience ourselves to *be* <I>selves</I>: to be <I>free and rational agents</I> who <I>know</I> and <I>understand</I> and <I>reason</I>. And we do understand those qualities to be what makes us what we are: we understand the abnegation of those characteristice to be the abnegation of our very own selves.<BR/><BR/>Ergo, either:<BR/>1) our experience and understanding (however imperfect that understanding is) of our own precise selves is not only incomplete, but false (*),<BR/>2) "physicalism" (aka "atheism") is false.<BR/><BR/><BR/>(*) This is why "physicalists" must always end up declaring that "consciousness" is an illusion, that there exists no "self." This seems to satisfy them -- because the goal is to protect <I>physicalism</I> (which is to say, the goal is to protect the denial of "<I>theism</I>"), not to arrive at a more accurate understanding of reality -- but it does raise the interesting question: "<I>Just who is it who is suffering the illusion/delusuib that *I* exist?</I>"Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-70162786073687884252008-08-11T22:05:00.000+01:002008-08-11T22:05:00.000+01:00Mr Weinberg, you are welcome to object to the assu...Mr Weinberg, you are welcome to object to the assumption of the existence of such a being. The question then is: if such a being could not exist, why not? After all, it is logically possible that such a being exists; indeed, not only is its existence logically possible, but also, given what we have assumed by standard physicalism, and were it not for our own felt consciousness, it seems logically more parsimonious that only such a being could exist, and that it would be gratuitous to postulate the existence of any being that was not so constituted. If, however, such a being is physically impossible, then we need to say why, since, given what we have assumed by physicalism, it is not physical-function that is the problem; it is precisely the existence of feeling that is without explanation. We should, as I pointed out, be more surprised at our own constitution. Professor Dennett’s string of words is not an explanation, it is a change of vocabulary and a reaffirmation of an assumption. It explains precisely nothing about feelings (or “qualia”, if you prefer). I think you are on the wrong track, if I may say so, in mentioning his “ideas about consciousness”, because, so far as I can tell, he doesn’t have any. He has many ideas about something he calls “consciousness”. As Galen Strawson puts it, Dennett “looking-glasses” the word “consciousness” to mean something that involves no consciousness. Why? Because consciousness is a damned difficult thing to fit into standard physicalism. (See also Harnad, footnote 22, and the links to his papers.) Dennett does not say that qualia (or “feelings”, as I prefer) come about as a result of dispositions and blah-di-blah; he denies that they come about at all. He does not say that any intelligent being would experience qualia; on the contrary, he says that no being experiences qualia, that qualia are nothing but blah-di-blah. If Dennett’s ideas about “consciousness” are close to correct, as you put it, then not only could such an intelligent but feelingless being exist, but, according to him, you are one.Deogolwulfhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02197539477668018797noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-51942125996074790592008-08-10T01:39:00.000+01:002008-08-10T01:39:00.000+01:00Imagine that out of this unfeeling, non-experienti...<I>Imagine that out of this unfeeling, non-experiential quantity of physical stuff, evolution has brought forth on a gaseous planet far from our own a super-intelligent life-form without consciousness. No experiential qualities — or “feelings”, if you prefer — have somehow emerged for it out of the aforementioned physical world.</I><BR/><BR/>But if Dennet's ideas about consciousness are close to correct, as I suspect they are, such a being could not exist. If qualia come about as a result of "the sum total of all the idiosyncratic reactive dispositions inherent in [one’s] nervous system as a result of [one’s] being confronted by a certain pattern of stimulation”, any intelligent being would experience qualia.George Weinberghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05384566536853204992noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-44020804402303781102008-08-08T10:49:00.000+01:002008-08-08T10:49:00.000+01:00Anonymouse,That question is silly. And illogical....Anonymouse,<BR/>That question is silly. And illogical. And possibly irrational.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-37558412994498937752008-08-07T16:08:00.000+01:002008-08-07T16:08:00.000+01:00Which would you say is more likely: The non-existe...Which would you say is more likely: The non-existence of sensations, or the existence of demons?<BR/><BR/>ipAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-22156723032276795242008-07-30T22:33:00.000+01:002008-07-30T22:33:00.000+01:00Gentlemen, I thank you for your thought-provoking ...Gentlemen, I thank you for your thought-provoking comments. Related to this matter is an interesting discussion at Malcolm Pollack's blog, <A HREF="http://malcolmpollack.com/2008/07/08/the-meaning-of-life/" REL="nofollow">here</A>. (Number of comments is already over 100.)Deogolwulfhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02197539477668018797noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-55323464364127389862008-07-30T13:26:00.000+01:002008-07-30T13:26:00.000+01:00Addofio: "That's not a link; I don't know how to d...<B>Addofio:</B> "<I>That's not a link; I don't know how to do that in a comment ...</I>"<BR/><BR/>Try this -- except replace the square brackets ("[" and "]") with angle brackets ("<" and ">"):<BR/>[a href="http://addofio.wordpress.com/2007/03/26/belief-and-certainty/"]Belief and certainty[/a] resulting in this: <A HREF="http://addofio.wordpress.com/2007/03/26/belief-and-certainty/" REL="nofollow">(Self-contradiction about) Belief and certainty</A>Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-90157998761039922782008-07-28T18:46:00.000+01:002008-07-28T18:46:00.000+01:00kairosfocus:I attempted a reply to your question, ...kairosfocus:<BR/><BR/>I attempted a reply to your question, but it somehow didn't survive the word verification process. I'll try again.<BR/><BR/>Pure logic only takes us so far, and whether or not it is compelling to a second person depends essentially on agreement into the undefined inputs and assumptions upon which the logic operates. Even in mathematics, that most purely logical of disciplines, there exist true but unprovable statements, and entire mathematical systems which are based on differing assumptions, but which are equally valid mathematical systems. If this is true when reasoning about mathematics, how much more likely is it to be the case when we reason about the "real world"? And still more when we reason about spiritual matters?<BR/><BR/>I personally find the debunking of arguments both for and against the existence of God to be far more convincing than the constructive areguments themselves. Such beliefs are, IMO, more a matter of faith than reason, and reasonably so. One person may find such an argument convincing, another not, without the resulting belief of either person being necessarily irrational.<BR/><BR/>I wrote a longer post relevant to this some time ago, if you are interested:<BR/><BR/>http://addofio.wordpress.com/2007/03/26/belief-and-certainty/<BR/><BR/>(That's not a link; I don't know how to do that in a comment, and some bloggers don't allow links in comments anyway.)<BR/><BR/>If you find that my thoughts on this matter render me irrational--well, we may have to leave it at that.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-56810355890791822692008-07-26T11:54:00.000+01:002008-07-26T11:54:00.000+01:00GentlemenInteresting. Very interesting.Well done, ...Gentlemen<BR/><BR/>Interesting. Very interesting.<BR/><BR/>Well done, Deogolwulf.<BR/><BR/>Addofio, the issue is not whether there are other possible worldviews out there that must then meet their own difficulties, on their own merits or on a comparative basis, but the factual adequacy, explanatory power and indeed coherence of that dominant, evolutionary materialistic scientism that dominates the western world's current mindset. And, in that context, a reductio argument backed up by reference to actual leading evolutionary materialist thinkers is entirely appropriate.<BR/><BR/>As to the onward argument in brief, "I could believe that mind and consciousness are perfectly natural emergent qualities of the physical world, yet not themselves physical," this is, I am afraid a resort to inadvertently distracting word magic. <BR/><BR/>Why do I say that?<BR/><BR/>First, by use of Q-mech etc, we can reasonably explain how the properties of common salt emerge from those of Na and Cl, under certain circumstances. But, the properties and first person experiences of consciousness are RADICALLY different from those of matter and energy in interaction under blind mechanical necessity and chance circumstances. Such emergence as one may assert needs significant warrant, on pain of the term simply being yet another distraction from the substantial issue, as the original post pointed out.<BR/><BR/>So far as I am aware, no-one has as yet provided such warrant. (Had that been done, we would not see the sorts of arguments Dennett is using.)<BR/><BR/>The matter goes deeper yet. <BR/><BR/>One of the key felt experiences is that of <I>following and so consciously understanding</I> a course of argument, and then, on reflection, <I>consciously deciding</I> to accept or reject the logic involved. That is, significantly free and responsible choice is deeply, inextricably -- and I daresay irreducibly -- involved. <BR/><BR/>Thence, if one does not in reality have such choice on matters of cognition, one ends up in the self-referential absurdities of choice and reason becoming untrustworthy delusions driven by forces that reduce in the end to chance plus mechanical necessity. In which case, why do you FEEL it is important to argue and plead for reason in this thread?<BR/><BR/>So, how, then, do you argue: <I>there simply is no argument, and no evidence, that <B>compels</B> anyone to believe one way or another regarding the existence or non-existence of God or gods</I>?<BR/><BR/>Just a thought . . .<BR/><BR/>GEM of TKIAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-58534370542435379312008-07-26T05:56:00.000+01:002008-07-26T05:56:00.000+01:00As a confirmed agnostic, let me respond to Ilion:I...As a confirmed agnostic, let me respond to Ilion:<BR/><BR/>It's not at all inconsistent to disbelieve in a Creator God, and still believe that mind and consciousness are real and not reducible to physics. I could believe in a god that is not a creator god, or I could believe that mind and consciousness are perfectly natural emergent qualities of the physical world, yet not themselves physical. Your argument is no doubt convincing to you; but there simply is no argument, and no evidence, that compels anyone to believe one way or another regarding the existence or non-existence of God or gods. Which to me means that there is nothing inherently irrational about in either theism or atheism (or agnosticism) per se. It is perfectly reasonable to believe as you do for yourself; it is not, however, reasonable for you to insist that I must also believe it.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-77943297810984654112008-07-26T02:33:00.000+01:002008-07-26T02:33:00.000+01:00(I apologize upfront for the brevity of this post ...(I apologize upfront for the brevity of this post and that due to that it may not be entirely clear what I mean to get at.)<BR/><BR/>I wonder, Deogolwulf (and your readers, of course):<BR/><BR/>Have you yet noticed or realized that the argument you lay out here is a decisive -- and fatal -- refutation of atheism, of the denial that there exists a Creator/God? <BR/><BR/>If one claims to be a logically consistent atheist, then one's metaphysic must be 'materialism/physicalism' -- which is to say, one must assert that 'mind' is not basic or fundamental to the nature of reality. Now, that particular metaphysic can't stretch to give us a "<I>satisfactory account of meaning, intentionality, and purpose</I>" -- which no doubt goes far in explaining why the "top drawer" atheists tend to deny that these things (and consciousness, in general) even exist -- and here we see that the metaphysic can't even account for mere "feelings!"<BR/><BR/>As Addofio rightly says: "<I>... anyone who denies the existence of his or her own consciousness or feelings has exempted themselves (pardon the pronoun) from any attribution of rationality. One's own existence and consciousness are the most empirical of empirical facts, on which all else rests.</I>"<BR/><BR/><BR/>We, each of us, *know* beyond any possibility of error that we, ourselves, exist. If we know nothing else, we know this (and, all other knowledge we may ever attain builds upon, depends upon, that knowledge). But, a logically consistent atheism compels us to categorically deny that we, our very own selves, exist! <BR/><BR/>But, this is absurd: we exist; we *know* that we exist. And so, we know that anything which tends to the denial of our own existence is at error in some way or another. <BR/><BR/>With atheism, this denial of our own existence follows logically and inescapably from the fundamental premise (i.e. "<I>There is no God</I>"); that is, this aburdity is inherent, inescapable, and irreparable. The atheist can fix the error only by abandoning the atheism.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-18841874814970170062008-07-25T16:23:00.000+01:002008-07-25T16:23:00.000+01:00Very refreshing. The best sense I've read on the ...Very refreshing. The best sense I've read on the internet on this topic in a long time. And with just enough bite to the prose to be entertaining also.<BR/><BR/>IMO, anyone who denies the existence of his or her own consciousness or feelings has exempted themselves (pardon the pronoun) from any attribution of rationality. One's own existence and consciousness are the most empirical of empirical facts, on which all else rests. Deny mine if you will--I of course know better, but I can at least see another's denial of my consciousness as (marginally) rational. But deny your own? And expect me to believe you? You've definitely wandered through the looking glass<BR/><BR/>Have you read the book "A Mind So Rare: The evolution of human consciousness" by Merlin Donald? It's the best thing I've read on the subject, partly because he draws on many areas--philosophy, evolution, cognitive psychology, neurology, and others--to tackle it. It always puzzles me why philosophers, or physicists, think the questions of consciousness are purely philosophical Qs, or Qs of physics.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-44306471777992139312008-07-24T11:14:00.000+01:002008-07-24T11:14:00.000+01:00Yet even pain, a feeling which might seem as expli...Yet even pain, a feeling which might seem as explicable in physical-functional terms as it is obvious to the subject of it, remains wholly mysterious.<BR/><BR/>Yes it does indeed. We were talking yesterday about the power of being able to overcome certain of our ailments by positive thinking, by having a windfall or enjoying a good wine in company.<BR/><BR/>I'd like to recount that this occurred to me recently, where all manner of ailments disappeared as if by magic when a positive gettogether was on the day's agenda later.<BR/><BR/>Malingerer? Possibly but there is definitely something in it all. Faith healing - what about that? All hogwash?<BR/><BR/>I believe feeling exists quite independently of physical functionality or at least has the power to influence it.James Highamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14525082702330365464noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-10008163841736243832008-07-24T10:17:00.000+01:002008-07-24T10:17:00.000+01:00Ta very much!Ta very much!Deogolwulfhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02197539477668018797noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-60976244117789384592008-07-24T05:36:00.000+01:002008-07-24T05:36:00.000+01:00Deogolwulf: I just wanted to express my admiration...Deogolwulf: I just wanted to express my admiration and appreciation for that.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-15065869895010405042008-07-22T17:44:00.000+01:002008-07-22T17:44:00.000+01:00They deny everything they use to deny everythingThey deny everything they use to deny everythingSky Captainhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15154273736917461358noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-13949355664382847592008-07-22T13:25:00.000+01:002008-07-22T13:25:00.000+01:00Quite right, Recusant. But then I wouldn't like to...Quite right, Recusant. But then I wouldn't like to be a member of any club of which the members were mostly self-congratulatory muppets calling themselves "brights".Deogolwulfhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02197539477668018797noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-6904058665468252342008-07-22T13:06:00.000+01:002008-07-22T13:06:00.000+01:00But then being a bright is, according to him, only...But then being a bright is, according to him, only available to materialist atheists like himself.<BR/><BR/>You see, as we are not wearing the correct tie, we cannot be allowed into the club. Still I quite like the colour scheme of my Burkean Chestertonian club tie.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-22458742158925715492008-07-22T12:41:00.000+01:002008-07-22T12:41:00.000+01:00Ha, most likely! Of course, he is a very clever ma...Ha, most likely! Of course, he <I>is</I> a very clever man, and I doubt it would seem to him otherwise.Deogolwulfhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02197539477668018797noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13305228.post-41856797600371925112008-07-22T12:19:00.000+01:002008-07-22T12:19:00.000+01:00It seems to me that you feel that Professor Dennet...It seems to me that you feel that Professor Dennett is not as bright as he seemingly feels himself to be.<BR/><BR/>But then I'm not very bright and, according to his feelings about the nature of the world and cosmos, it seems to be that he wouldn't feel you were very bright either.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com